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Introduction:	  The	  logic	  of	  social	  cooperation	  for	  mutual	  advantage	  –	  The	  
democratic	  contract.1	  Dario	  Castiglione	  	  Can	  an	  attractive	  view	  of	  democratic	  politics	  and	  social	  justice	  be	  systematically	  derived	  from	  the	  hard-­‐headed	  premise	  that	  social	  cooperation	  rests	  on	  the	  interaction	  of	  individuals	  who	  are	  rationally	  prudent	  and	  motivated	  by	  their	  own	  (mutual)	  advantage?	  On	  the	  evidence	  of	  Albert	  Weale’s	  recent	  book	  (2013),2	  this	  is	  possible,	  or	  at	  least	  it	  is	  an	  avenue	  worth	  exploring.	  Weale’s	  vision	  of	  such	  a	  society	  is	  perhaps	  best	  captured	  by	  the	  epigrammatic	  sentence	  that	  ends	  his	  book:	  ‘in	  such	  a	  society,	  individuals	  can	  be	  for	  themselves;	  but	  they	  will	  never	  be	  only	  for	  themselves’	  (p.	  244).	  The	  point	  of	  the	  book	  is	  to	  uncover	  the	  ‘logic’	  and	  the	  principles	  that	  make	  such	  a	  society	  both	  possible	  and	  stable.	  The	  point	  of	  our	  symposium	  is	  to	  see	  how	  successful	  the	  book	  is	  in	  general,	  and	  occasionally	  in	  the	  detail.	  In	  this	  Introduction,	  I	  shall	  first	  briefly	  summarise	  the	  argument	  of	  the	  book,	  then	  look	  at	  how	  it	  originated	  and	  at	  its	  main	  scope	  and	  originality,	  and	  	  finally	  identify	  several	  lines	  of	  criticism	  advanced	  in	  the	  Symposium.	  	  
The	  book’s	  argument	  It	  is	  possible	  to	  think	  of	  the	  argument	  of	  the	  book	  as	  implying	  three	  main	  strategic	  moves,	  and	  a	  final	  qualification.	  The	  first	  of	  such	  moves	  (Chapters	  1,	  2	  and	  4)	  consists	  in	  a	  justification	  of	  social	  contract	  both	  as	  the	  representation	  of	  the	  logic	  of	  viable	  societies	  in	  the	  face	  of	  social	  traps,	  and	  as	  a	  method	  for	  reconstructing	  and	  giving	  sense	  to	  our	  moral	  intuitions	  about	  just	  cooperation.	  Weale	  defends	  a	  particular	  theory	  of	  social	  contract,	  based	  on	  mutual	  advantage	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and	  an	  ‘empirical’	  –	  as	  opposed	  to	  a	  priori	  or	  ‘hypothetical’	  –	  reconstruction	  of	  its	  conditions,	  logic	  and	  operations.	  According	  to	  Weale,	  this	  implies	  what	  he	  names	  a	  ‘deliberative’	  conception	  of	  rationality,	  and	  a	  basic	  condition	  of	  equality,	  which	  determines	  the	  democratic	  character	  of	  the	  negotiations	  between	  the	  parties.	  From	  this,	  he	  derives	  the	  idea	  of	  a	  democratic	  social	  contract	  ,	  which	  arguably	  represents	  the	  skeleton	  of	  his	  theory	  of	  democratic	  justice.	  I	  shall	  discuss	  such	  a	  theory	  at	  more	  length	  in	  the	  next	  two	  sections.	  Because	  Weale’s	  emphasis	  on	  the	  ‘empirical’	  social	  contract,	  his	  second	  
move	  (Chapters	  2	  and	  3)	  consists	  in	  identifying	  particular	  types	  of	  society	  that	  exhibit	  the	  conditions	  for	  the	  democratic	  social	  contract,	  so	  to	  draw	  from	  them	  principles	  of	  economic	  justice	  and	  political	  organization.	  Weale	  proposes	  to	  take	  regimes	  of	  common	  pool	  resources	  as	  a	  stylized	  model.	  He	  puts	  great	  store	  on	  the	  sense	  in	  which	  we	  should	  understand	  ‘model’	  (pp.	  59-­‐63).	  This	  is	  not	  meant	  as	  a	  ‘blueprint’	  or	  as	  an	  ‘ideal’	  to	  be	  either	  imitated	  or	  approximated.	  His	  use	  of	  ‘model’	  is	  meant	  in	  a	  more	  structural	  and	  functional	  sense,	  as	  either	  an	  ‘analogue	  machine,’	  displaying	  some	  of	  the	  key	  functions	  of	  the	  population	  of	  societies	  for	  which	  this	  is	  a	  model;	  or	  as	  a	  logical	  model	  formalising	  the	  set	  of	  axioms	  that	  defines	  a	  system.	  The	  common	  pool	  resources	  regimes	  studied	  in	  particular	  by	  Elinor	  Ostrom	  and	  her	  associates	  at	  the	  Indiana	  Workshop	  provide	  Weale	  with	  a	  rich	  social	  experience	  of	  small	  scale	  societies	  addressing	  social	  cooperation	  problems,	  and	  approximating	  Weale’s	  conditions	  for	  the	  democratic	  social	  contract.	  From	  these	  regimes,	  Weale	  draws	  several	  institutional	  principles,	  but	  also	  some	  of	  the	  principles	  of	  economic	  justice.	  The	  latter,	  he	  identifies	  with	  the	  producers’	  entitlement	  to	  the	  full	  fruits	  of	  their	  labour,	  provided	  there	  is	  equal	  access	  to	  the	  essential	  means	  of	  production.3	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Although	  the	  common	  pool	  resources	  regimes	  offer	  a	  stylized	  model,	  Weale	  regards	  the	  principles	  to	  be	  derived	  from	  such	  a	  model	  to	  need	  considerable	  accommodation	  to	  be	  applied	  to	  more	  complex	  and	  industrialized	  societies.	  This	  is	  his	  third	  move.	  Chapter	  5	  identifies	  the	  main	  aspects	  of	  the	  ‘great	  transformation’:	  increasing	  economic	  interdependence,	  changing	  function	  of	  the	  household,	  growth	  of	  corporations,	  greater	  need	  for	  the	  supply	  of	  public	  goods	  and	  social	  governance.	  Chapter	  6	  discusses	  the	  forms	  of	  political	  decision	  making	  that	  best	  meets	  the	  criteria	  of	  democratic	  justice,	  which	  Weale	  broadly	  defines	  as	  responsiveness	  to	  social	  pluralism	  and	  meeting	  the	  requirements	  of	  deliberative	  rationality.	  Chapter	  7	  tries	  to	  adapt	  the	  full-­‐fruit	  principle	  to	  the	  more	  socialized	  conditions	  of	  market	  economy,	  industrialized	  production,	  and	  the	  transformation	  of	  the	  household.	  Weale	  suggests	  that	  holding	  on	  to	  the	  idea	  of	  producers’	  entitlement	  to	  the	  marginal	  product	  (as	  an	  extension	  of	  the	  full-­‐fruit	  principle)	  is	  still	  a	  demand	  of	  justice,	  even	  though	  there	  are	  considerable	  technical	  problems	  on	  how	  to	  disentangle	  individual’s	  contribution	  from	  those	  deriving	  from	  socialization	  and	  interdependency.	  The	  latter	  should	  be	  covered	  through	  workers’	  contribution	  to	  common	  production	  overheads.	  As	  for	  the	  economies	  of	  needs	  and	  social	  reproduction,	  Weale	  believes	  that	  these	  should	  be	  thought	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  life-­‐cycle	  redistribution	  (insurance	  against	  personal	  risk),	  rather	  than	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  redistribution	  across	  society.	  	   	  The	  concluding	  chapter	  qualifies	  the	  previous	  moves	  by	  addressing	  the	  issue	  of	  social	  stability	  through	  a	  discussion	  of	  a	  sense	  of	  justice	  and	  the	  need	  for	  governance.	  Weale	  identifies	  the	  sense	  of	  justice	  with	  the	  principle	  of	  reciprocity4;	  but	  also	  suggests	  that	  such	  a	  sense	  requires	  people	  to	  attend	  to	  others’	  claim	  even	  when	  they	  have	  no	  power.	  The	  internalization	  of	  the	  sense	  of	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justice	  makes	  it	  possible	  for	  citizens	  to	  understand	  themselves	  as	  cooperative	  beings,	  whose	  pride	  and	  self-­‐esteem	  partly	  depends	  on	  their	  feeling	  of	  contributing	  to	  a	  common	  enterprise	  for	  mutual	  advantage.	  	  
The	  scope	  and	  context	  for	  a	  social	  contract	  theory	  of	  justice	  and	  democracy	  By	  presenting	  the	  core	  argument	  of	  the	  book	  as	  a	  theory	  of	  ‘democratic	  justice,’	  Weale	  places	  his	  contribution	  within	  two	  overlapping,	  and	  yet	  rather	  distinct	  literatures	  in	  contemporary	  political	  theory.	  Not	  many	  authors	  have	  engaged	  with	  the	  crucial	  nexus	  between	  democracy	  and	  justice,	  treating	  them	  as	  part	  of	  a	  unified	  theory.	  Ian	  Shapiro’s	  Democratic	  Justice	  is	  one	  such	  example,	  suggesting	  that	  these	  ideals	  are	  ‘mutually	  implicating,’	  since	  democracy	  has	  both	  a	  legitimacy	  conferring	  and	  justice	  promoting	  role	  (Shapiro,	  1999,	  pp.	  19-­‐21).	  Jürgen	  Habermas’s	  Between	  Facts	  and	  Norms	  (1996)	  is	  also	  an	  attempt,	  from	  both	  a	  normative,	  and	  a	  more	  positive	  perspective,	  to	  explore	  the	  internal	  relationship	  between	  private	  and	  public	  autonomy,	  in	  the	  form	  of	  the	  modern	  projects	  of	  self-­‐realization	  	  and	  self-­‐determination.	  In	  spite	  of	  a	  few	  points	  of	  agreement,	  neither	  of	  these	  authors	  offers	  a	  conceptual	  vocabulary	  or	  a	  way	  of	  problematizing	  the	  questions	  of	  justice	  and	  democracy	  that	  is	  close	  to	  Weale’s.	  The	  story	  is	  very	  different	  in	  Rawls’s	  case,	  who	  is	  by	  far	  the	  most	  cited	  author	  in	  the	  book.	  There	  are	  obvious	  elective	  affinities	  in	  view	  of	  the	  common	  tradition	  of	  political	  theory	  in	  which	  they	  locate	  themselves.	  Moreover,	  as	  Josh	  Cohen	  has	  remarked,	  although	  Rawls’s	  work	  does	  not	  seem	  to	  engage	  extensively	  with	  democracy,	  in	  the	  very	  Preface	  to	  A	  Theory	  of	  Justice	  Rawls	  says	  that	  justice	  as	  fairness	  is	  the	  ‘moral	  basis’	  for	  a	  ‘democratic	  society,’	  thus	  making	  a	  democratic	  regime	  a	  ‘requirement	  of	  justice	  –	  and	  not	  simply	  for	  instrumental	  reasons.’	  
	   5	  
(Cohen,	  2010,	  p.	  182,	  emphasis	  added).5	  In	  short,	  the	  Rawlsian	  inspired	  debate	  on	  how	  a	  liberal	  theory	  of	  justice	  can	  be	  internally	  linked	  to	  democratic	  politics	  is	  the	  appropriate	  intellectual	  context	  for	  Weale’s	  project.	  Yet,	  there	  is	  a	  more	  particular	  connection	  that	  may	  help	  us	  clarifying	  the	  scope	  and	  method	  of	  Weale’s	  democratic	  justice.	  There	  is	  a	  sense	  in	  which	  Weale’s	  book	  is	  the	  result	  of	  an	  extended	  conversation	  with	  another	  recent	  liberal	  theorist	  of	  justice,	  the	  late	  Brian	  Barry.	  The	  connection	  with	  Barry	  is	  useful	  for	  more	  than	  one	  reason.	  In	  point	  of	  style	  and	  mode	  of	  arguing,	  one	  is	  inclined	  to	  pay	  Weale	  the	  same	  compliment	  he	  paid	  to	  Barry,	  as	  his	  work	  lies	  within	  the	  best	  tradition	  of	  British	  political	  thought,	  combining	  ‘conceptual	  abstraction	  and	  an	  engagement	  with	  concrete	  problems’	  (Weale,	  1998,	  p.	  9),	  focussing	  on	  the	  evaluation	  of	  general	  policies	  and	  institutions,	  through	  an	  analytical	  investigation	  of	  the	  political	  arguments	  used	  in	  their	  support.	  Issues	  of	  method	  and	  substance	  are	  also	  thrown	  in	  sharp	  relief	  by	  taking	  Barry’s	  work	  as	  a	  catalyst	  for	  Weale’s	  preoccupations.	  Barry’s	  influence	  is	  readily	  acknowledged	  in	  the	  Preface	  of	  the	  book	  (pp.	  xvi	  and	  xxi),	  and	  in	  particular	  with	  respect	  to	  Weale’s	  own	  adoption	  of	  the	  ‘empirical’	  method.	  	  However,	  more	  than	  in	  agreement,	  Weale’s	  book	  is	  written	  in	  critical	  engagement	  with	  Barry.	  Arguably,	  Weale’s	  distinctive	  position	  has	  emerged	  from	  a	  reflection	  over	  the	  limits	  of	  Barry’s	  theories	  of	  justice	  and	  contractualism.	  As	  we	  shall	  see	  in	  more	  detail	  later	  on,	  Weale’s	  is	  a	  defence	  of	  what	  he	  presents	  as	  a	  coherent	  mutual	  advantage	  contractarianism	  against	  impartialist	  critiques	  of	  it	  such	  as	  Barry’s.	  But,	  as	  the	  engagement	  with	  Barry	  shows,	  Weale	  did	  not	  always	  embrace	  social	  contract	  theory	  wholeheartedly.	  Two	  essays	  (Weale	  1998,	  2004),	  both	  published	  in	  volumes	  dedicated	  to	  Barry’s	  work,	  give	  an	  insight	  in	  the	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making	  of	  Democratic	  Justice	  and	  the	  Social	  Contract.	  In	  the	  earlier	  one,	  Weale	  (1998)	  engages	  primarily	  with	  Barry’s	  form	  of	  hypothetical	  contractualism,	  mainly	  based	  on	  the	  Scanlonian	  negative	  formula,	  that	  just	  principles	  are	  those	  that	  can	  be	  justified	  in	  ways	  that	  no	  one	  could	  reasonably	  reject	  (Barry,	  1995,	  pp.	  67-­‐72;	  Scanlon,	  1998,	  pp.	  189-­‐97).	  	  Although	  Barry	  was	  not	  entirely	  wedded	  to	  contractualism,	  nor	  to	  its	  Scanlonian	  version,	  (Barry,	  1995,	  p.	  70;	  1998,	  pp.	  187-­‐88),	  something	  that	  Weale	  readily	  recognises;	  most	  of	  Weale’s	  article	  is	  meant	  to	  show	  how	  Barry’s	  uses	  of	  the	  contract	  argument	  to	  articulate	  a	  theory	  of	  justice	  for	  a	  society	  of	  people	  with	  different	  conceptions	  of	  the	  good,	  ‘introduces	  an	  unnecessary	  theoretical	  epicycle	  into	  what	  is	  otherwise	  a	  coherent	  account	  of	  social	  justice	  in	  particular	  and	  political	  morality	  in	  general’	  (Weale,	  1998,	  p.	  12).	  For	  Weale,	  Barry’s,	  or	  the	  contractualist	  aspirations	  in	  general	  are	  the	  right	  ones:	  to	  construct	  a	  second-­‐order	  devise	  like	  the	  social	  contract,	  through	  which	  to	  solve	  the	  plurality,	  complexities,	  and	  conflicting	  nature	  of	  the	  principles	  and	  intuitions	  to	  which	  we	  appeal	  at	  the	  first-­‐order	  level	  of	  our	  political	  arguments	  over	  institutional	  and	  social	  arrangements.	  According	  to	  Weale,	  Barry’s	  justice	  as	  impartiality,	  though	  attractive	  in	  many	  respects,	  simply	  displaces	  substantive	  disagreement	  from	  the	  first-­‐	  to	  the	  second-­‐order	  level	  –	  in	  other	  words,	  it	  is	  not	  constructivist	  enough.	  ‘One	  possible	  conclusion	  –	  Weale	  writes	  in	  that	  article	  –	  is	  that	  some	  theorist	  should	  have	  a	  go	  at	  reconstructing	  yet	  another	  version	  of	  contract	  theory	  that	  will	  overcome	  these	  difficulties.’	  Only	  to	  add,	  perhaps	  ironically	  in	  retrospect,	  that	  ‘personally	  I	  do	  not	  see	  much	  future	  in	  this’	  (Weale,	  1998,	  p.	  34).	  	   A	  certain	  amount	  of	  scepticism	  remains	  in	  the	  later	  article	  (Weale,	  2004),	  published,	  interestingly	  from	  our	  present	  perspective,	  in	  a	  collection	  dedicated	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to	  Barry	  on	  Justice	  and	  Democracy	  (Dowding,	  Goodin,	  Pateman	  2004).	  Indeed,	  both	  the	  editors	  and	  many	  of	  the	  contributors	  to	  that	  collection	  incline	  to	  highlight	  the	  tensions,	  rather	  than	  the	  internal	  reconciliation	  between	  the	  two	  ideals.	  On	  his	  part,	  Weale’s	  contribution	  is	  more	  sanguine	  on	  this.	  His	  central	  concern	  remains	  the	  possibility	  for	  a	  theory	  of	  social	  contract	  to	  define	  the	  terms	  and	  principles	  of	  social	  cooperation	  (i.e.	  the	  content	  of	  justice)	  ‘in	  the	  light	  of	  there	  being	  plural	  intuitions’	  (Weale,	  2004,	  p.	  82).	  In	  doing	  so,	  Weale	  pursues	  a	  number	  of	  lines	  of	  argument,	  many	  of	  which	  return	  in	  Democratic	  Justice	  and	  the	  
Social	  Contract,	  but	  the	  most	  distinctive	  of	  which	  is	  perhaps	  the	  dissection	  of	  the	  pros	  and	  contras	  of	  two	  forms	  of	  agreement,	  one	  based	  on	  ‘rational’,	  the	  other	  on	  ‘reasonable’	  choice	  (Weale,	  2004,	  p.	  88-­‐95).	  While	  the	  former,	  at	  least	  in	  certain	  restrictive	  conditions,	  seems	  to	  provide	  determined	  results,	  but	  may	  lack	  plausibility	  when	  put	  to	  the	  test	  of	  reflective	  equilibrium;	  the	  latter	  yields	  more	  plausible	  results,	  which	  Weale,	  however,	  thinks	  it	  is	  more	  difficult	  to	  sustain	  by	  the	  test	  of	  reasonableness	  alone,	  since	  this	  is	  either	  too	  indeterminate	  or	  too	  thick.	  In	  short,	  ‘the	  problem	  of	  persistent	  pluralism	  is	  an	  embarrassment	  for	  any	  version	  of	  contract	  theory	  that	  quite	  explicitly	  is	  intended	  to	  provide	  a	  method	  of	  
ethics’	  (Weale,	  2004,	  p.	  93,	  emphasis	  added).	  	  	   I	  think	  this	  takes	  us	  to	  the	  crux	  of	  both	  the	  scope	  and	  the	  method	  of	  Weale’s	  book.	  As	  for	  the	  method,	  there	  is	  a	  strong	  Sidgwickian	  undertone	  to	  Weale’s	  intellectual	  enterprise:	  the	  need,	  so	  to	  speak,	  to	  methodize,	  to	  give	  reflective	  and	  systematic	  order	  to	  our	  intuitions	  on	  how	  to	  act	  and	  organize	  our	  social	  relations	  and	  institutions	  (cf.	  p.	  12).6	  In	  the	  two	  essays	  just	  discussed,	  this	  methodical	  (and	  constructivist)	  aspiration	  seems	  to	  be	  frustrated.	  The	  tentative	  conclusion	  is	  that,	  however	  attractive	  is	  the	  attempt	  to	  arrive	  at	  a	  ‘high-­‐order	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constructive	  criteria’	  (cf.	  Rawls,	  1971,	  p.	  34;	  Barry	  1990,	  p.	  xlii)	  according	  to	  which	  to	  organize	  our	  principles	  of	  justice,	  the	  best	  we	  can	  do	  is	  a	  judicious	  balancing	  of	  political	  arguments	  and	  moral	  intuitions.	  In	  1998	  such	  a	  negative	  conclusion	  is	  more	  resolutely	  stated,	  favouring	  ‘greater	  pluralism	  about	  principles’	  as	  a	  way	  of	  reaching	  more	  balanced	  arguments,	  and	  even	  suggesting	  a	  retreat	  to	  the	  pre-­‐Rawlsian	  political	  philosophy	  of	  Political	  Argument	  (Barry,	  1990)	  as	  a	  welcome	  ‘mapping	  of	  the	  first-­‐order	  arguments	  that	  pervade	  political	  and	  public	  choice’	  (Weale,	  1998,	  p.	  34).	  By	  2004,	  the	  tone	  is	  more	  upbeat,	  and	  although	  Weale	  seems	  still	  convinced	  that	  the	  two	  families	  of	  contract	  theory	  (the	  ‘rational’	  and	  the	  ‘reasonable’)7	  offer	  a	  ‘reductionist	  programme’	  for	  political	  reflection	  and	  deliberation	  (Weale,	  2004,	  p.	  96),	  at	  several	  points	  Weale	  seems	  to	  suggest	  that	  there	  is	  something	  in	  the	  social	  contract	  argument	  that	  may	  be	  rescued	  (Weale,	  2004,	  pp.	  92-­‐93).	  	   The	  issue	  of	  method	  –	  the	  social	  contract	  as	  the	  ‘high	  order	  constructive	  criteria’	  through	  which	  to	  order	  our	  intuitions	  about	  justice	  and	  social	  cooperation	  –	  sets	  the	  scope	  for	  democratic	  justice	  and	  for	  the	  substantive	  topics	  explored	  in	  the	  book.	  But,	  having	  identified	  the	  agenda	  for	  a	  theory	  of	  democratic	  justice,	  what	  did	  convince	  Weale	  to	  move	  from	  pluralism	  to	  contract?	  Arguably,	  the	  key	  ideas	  that	  seem	  to	  have	  made	  the	  difference	  in	  Weale’s	  mind	  are	  that	  of	  deliberative	  rationality,	  of	  an	  ‘empirical’	  version	  of	  contract	  theory,	  and	  his	  re-­‐evaluation	  of	  contract	  as	  mutual	  advantage.	  The	  latter	  conversion,	  so	  we	  are	  told,	  took	  place	  on	  the	  road	  to	  Toronto.8	  It	  is	  to	  such	  a	  conversion	  and	  to	  Weale’s	  democratic	  social	  contract	  that	  we	  can	  now	  turn.	  	  
The	  democratic	  social	  contract	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As	  already	  suggested,	  the	  theory	  of	  the	  democratic	  social	  contract	  is	  the	  
methodical	  core	  of	  the	  book.	  This	  has	  two	  main	  aims:	  to	  offer	  a	  coherent	  social	  contract	  theory,	  meeting	  both	  requirements	  of	  determinacy	  and	  plausibility;	  to	  show	  how	  the	  contractual	  logic	  applies	  to	  both	  justice	  and	  democracy.	  But,	  it	  may	  be	  appropriate	  to	  start	  by	  clarifying	  the	  meaning	  of	  ‘justice’	  as	  Weale	  seems	  to	  understand	  it.	  Justice	  is	  a	  notoriously	  impossible	  term	  to	  define.	  Within	  the	  social	  contract	  literature	  in	  which	  Weale’s	  argument	  is	  located,	  justice	  mainly	  refers	  to	  principles	  of	  distributive	  justice,	  though	  as	  part	  of	  a	  more	  general	  view	  of	  morality.	  One	  of	  the	  distinctive	  elements	  of	  this	  political	  philosophy	  tradition	  is	  the	  way	  in	  which	  political	  arguments	  are	  so	  much	  part	  of	  ethical	  discourse.	  Discussions	  of	  justice	  are	  also	  about	  personal	  morality,	  right	  and	  wrong	  conduct	  independently	  of	  social	  institutions.	  But,	  my	  impression	  is	  that	  Weale’s	  use	  of	  ‘justice’	  is	  more	  narrowly	  focussed	  on	  the	  justice	  of	  social	  institutions,	  not	  necessarily	  extending	  to	  morality	  at	  large,	  and	  thus	  allowing	  a	  certain	  autonomy	  of	  political	  argument	  from	  more	  general	  ethical	  considerations.	  What	  Weale	  takes	  to	  be	  justice	  seems	  to	  me	  to	  approach	  one	  of	  Sidgwick’s	  definition	  of	  ‘politics’,	  as	  ‘the	  theory	  of	  right	  social	  relations’	  (1981,	  p.	  1,	  ft.	  2).	  In	  this	  sense,	  	  the	  connection	  between	  justice	  and	  democracy	  appears	  in	  a	  stronger	  light.	  	   	  This	  takes	  us	  neatly	  to	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  book,	  where	  Weale	  sets	  up	  the	  problem	  as	  the	  ‘contest’	  of	  justice:	  the	  kind	  of	  controversies	  and	  disagreements	  over	  questions	  of	  property	  and	  entitlements.	  As	  he	  notices,	  such	  controversies	  immediately	  involve	  ‘how	  individuals	  relate	  to	  one	  another	  in	  a	  political	  association	  and	  what	  should	  be	  the	  powers	  of	  the	  political	  association	  in	  which	  they	  are	  members’	  (pp.	  2-­‐3).	  The	  ‘contest’	  about	  distributive	  justice	  is	  at	  the	  same	  time	  the	  ‘contest’	  over	  political	  authority.	  In	  the	  first	  chapters	  of	  the	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book,	  Weale	  explores	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  the	  social	  contract	  tradition	  has	  dealt	  with	  these	  contests.	  As	  we	  have	  seen,	  the	  main	  problem	  that	  he	  himself	  identifies	  is	  whether	  the	  social	  contract	  can	  provide	  a	  second-­‐	  or	  higher-­‐order	  criteria	  for	  social	  agreement.	  Ideally,	  the	  strength	  of	  social	  contract	  arguments	  lies	  in	  three	  of	  their	  features:	  their	  ability	  to	  offer	  a	  procedural	  basis	  on	  which	  to	  reach	  an	  agreement	  between	  the	  parts,	  thus	  trying	  to	  bypass	  substantive	  disagreements	  (the	  logic	  of	  the	  contract);	  the	  process	  through	  which	  the	  parties	  to	  the	  contract	  may	  be	  able	  to	  see	  that	  their	  interests	  lie	  in	  reaching	  an	  agreement	  (the	  
rationality	  of	  the	  contract);	  and	  the	  way	  in	  which	  the	  outcome	  of	  the	  agreement	  depends	  on	  the	  assent	  given	  by	  the	  parties	  (the	  legitimacy	  of	  the	  contract).	  These	  are	  my	  own,	  not	  Weale’s	  distinctions,	  but	  I	  think	  they	  can	  profitably	  be	  used	  to	  illustrate	  his	  conception	  of	  the	  social	  contract.	  	  	  Contractual	  logic	  On	  the	  logic	  of	  the	  contract,	  Weale’s	  main	  argument	  develops	  as	  a	  criticism	  of	  all	  forms	  of	  contractualism,	  while	  embracing	  a	  form	  of	  contractarianism	  based	  on	  mutual	  advantage	  (close	  to	  Gauthier,	  1986).	  From	  a	  terminological	  perspective,	  this	  distinction	  has	  only	  stabilized	  recently,	  even	  though	  there	  is	  still	  no	  complete	  agreement	  on	  what	  kind	  of	  domain	  or	  theories	  the	  two	  terms	  cover.9	  For	  our	  purposes,	  we	  may	  consider	  contractualist	  theories	  as	  those	  broadly	  of	  Kantian	  inspiration,	  which	  ground	  the	  social	  contract	  on	  an	  appeal	  to	  the	  reasonableness	  of	  the	  contracting	  parties,	  formulated	  in	  either	  positive	  (‘reasonably	  agree’)	  or	  negative	  terms	  (‘cannot	  reasonably	  reject’).	  From	  such	  a	  perspective,	  the	  idea	  of	  an	  hypothetical	  contract	  (particularly	  behind	  the	  veil	  of	  ignorance)	  graphically	  captures	  the	  pre-­‐requisite	  of	  reasonableness,	  but	  the	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crucial	  issue	  is	  how	  to	  devise	  an	  original	  position	  in	  which	  the	  agents	  choose	  fairly	  or	  impartially.	  As	  for	  contractarian	  theories,	  these	  are	  more	  directly	  influenced	  by	  Hobbes’s	  classical	  framing	  of	  the	  contract	  as	  a	  situation	  in	  which	  rationally	  prudent	  agents	  try	  to	  achieve	  an	  agreement	  to	  their	  mutual	  advantage.	  	  Weale’s	  main	  objection	  to	  the	  contractualist	  approach	  is	  that	  it	  introduces	  a	  moralized	  conception	  of	  either	  the	  agents’	  motives	  or	  of	  their	  rationality,	  or	  both.	  In	  brief,	  this	  conception	  of	  the	  social	  contract	  ‘risks	  circularity’	  (p.	  13),	  either	  by	  building	  as	  one	  of	  its	  premises	  a	  particular	  conception	  of	  what	  the	  agent	  considers	  to	  be	  just,	  in	  terms	  of	  treating	  people	  with	  equal	  consideration/respect/dignity	  –	  hence,	  a	  moralized	  conception	  of	  the	  person;	  or	  by	  starting	  from	  ‘a	  desire	  for	  reasonable	  agreement’	  (Scanlon,	  1982,	  p.	  115n;	  Barry,	  1995)	  –	  hence,	  a	  moralized	  conception	  of	  motives.	  As	  a	  consequence,	  contractualist	  conceptions	  fail	  to	  be	  truly	  constructivist	  (p.	  13),10	  and	  therefore	  displace	  fundamental	  disagreements	  from	  the	  first-­‐order	  level	  to	  the	  original	  position.	  Conversely,	  Weale	  believes	  that	  a	  contractarian	  position	  offers	  a	  genuinely	  non-­‐moralized	  and	  constructivist	  logic	  for	  social	  contract.	  This	  is	  so	  for	  several	  reasons.	  The	  conception	  of	  the	  person	  is	  that	  of	  individuals	  who	  advance	  their	  own	  personal	  (though	  not	  necessarily	  selfish)	  interests,	  as	  they	  conceive	  them,	  in	  a	  situation	  in	  which	  they	  are	  aware	  of	  the	  externalities	  posed	  by	  interacting	  with	  others	  (p.	  9).	  As	  to	  the	  motive	  of	  agreement,	  as	  Weale	  says,	  this	  arises	  ‘from	  the	  need	  to	  secure	  these	  personal	  interests,	  as	  distinct	  from	  the	  broader	  public	  interest,	  which	  is	  why	  the	  cooperation	  over	  the	  baseline	  point	  of	  non-­‐agreement	  has	  to	  be	  advantageous	  to	  all’	  (p.	  10).	  Finally,	  in	  the	  contractarian	  version,	  the	  parties	  to	  the	  agreement	  do	  not	  need	  to	  internalize	  the	  interests	  of	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others,	  apart	  from	  being	  aware	  of	  the	  ‘threat-­‐advantage’	  other	  people	  have	  in	  the	  pre-­‐contractual	  situation	  (p.	  11).	  	   On	  the	  basis	  of	  this	  analysis,	  Weale	  is	  satisfied	  that	  the	  contractarian	  logic,	  as	  opposed	  to	  the	  contractualist	  one,	  offers	  a	  more	  ‘realist’	  description	  of	  the	  pre-­‐contractual	  conditions,	  that	  it	  recognizes	  the	  plurality	  and	  permanence	  of	  the	  personal	  interests	  that	  social	  cooperation	  needs	  to	  accommodate,	  and	  that	  it	  is	  genuinely	  constructivist.	  But	  it	  will	  be	  remembered	  that	  a	  major	  consideration	  for	  Weale’s	  earlier	  scepticism	  with	  ‘any	  version’	  of	  social	  contract	  theory	  was	  the	  indeterminacy	  of	  the	  agreements	  reached	  in	  the	  original	  position.	  This	  is	  partly	  because	  of	  the	  abstractness	  of	  the	  kind	  of	  principles	  that	  can	  be	  arrived	  at	  in	  such	  a	  position,	  and	  partly	  because,	  as	  Weale	  suggests,	  both	  main	  versions	  of	  the	  contract	  theory	  rely	  on	  a	  purely	  hypothetical	  view	  of	  the	  social	  contract,	  which	  determines	  a-­‐priory	  the	  terms	  of	  the	  contract	  itself.	  Weale’s	  innovation,	  partly	  borrowed	  from	  Barry	  (but	  also	  gesturing	  to	  Amartya	  Sen’s	  comparative	  method,	  2009,	  pp.	  96-­‐105),	  is	  that	  he	  wishes	  to	  adopt	  an	  ‘empirical	  approach’	  (pp.	  13-­‐14,	  and	  31-­‐40).	  Such	  an	  approach	  aims	  to	  identify	  social	  organizations	  to	  which	  the	  contractarian	  logic	  applies,	  so	  that	  we	  can	  more	  surely	  determine	  the	  consequences	  that	  follow	  from	  the	  terms	  of	  the	  contract.	  This	  also	  allows	  Weale	  to	  suggest	  that	  certain	  democratic	  societies	  can	  be	  taken	  as	  a	  model	  for	  just	  social	  contract	  arrangements,	  or	  at	  least	  that	  one	  is	  able	  to	  apply	  the	  abstract	  logic	  of	  the	  social	  contract	  to	  them.11	  Overall,	  Weale	  believes	  that	  the	  logic	  of	  his	  ‘empirical’	  contractarianism	  is	  non-­‐moralized,	  constructivist,	  and	  able	  to	  produce	  relatively	  determined	  principles	  for	  social	  cooperation	  in	  different	  contexts.	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Contractual	  rationality	  What	  about	  the	  rationality	  of	  the	  contract?	  By	  it	  I	  mean	  the	  kind	  of	  reasoning	  that	  guides	  the	  agents	  in	  the	  process	  of	  reaching	  an	  agreement.	  On	  this,	  contractualist	  and	  contractarian	  views	  also	  divide	  along	  lines	  very	  similar	  to	  their	  conception	  of	  the	  person	  and	  of	  how	  she	  relates	  to	  others.	  As	  Weale	  suggests,	  ‘contractarian	  theories	  are	  typically	  associated	  with	  utility-­‐maximizing	  accounts	  of	  rationality’,	  while	  ‘contractualist	  theories	  are	  normally	  thought	  in	  deliberative	  terms’	  (pp.	  101-­‐102)	  –	  reasonableness	  rather	  than	  instrumental	  rationality.	  Because	  reasonableness’	  inbuilt	  assumption	  that	  choices	  and	  actions	  need	  to	  be	  justified	  in	  terms	  acceptable	  to	  others	  (internalizing	  others’	  interests	  and	  perspectives),	  this	  would	  seem	  to	  be	  incompatible	  with	  Weale’s	  contractarian	  logic.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  Weale	  suggests	  that	  contractarian	  views	  need	  not	  to	  be	  tied	  to	  a	  utility	  theory	  of	  rationality.	  (…)	  some	  account	  of	  deliberation	  is	  needed	  in	  theorizing	  prudent	  choice	  …	  Minimally	  moralized	  notions	  of	  prudence	  can	  still	  be	  deliberative.	  (p.	  102)	  	  	  According	  to	  Weale	  the	  contractarian	  view	  can	  rest	  on	  what	  he	  calls	  ‘deliberative	  rationality,’	  a	  kind	  of	  middle	  way	  between	  rational	  utility	  and	  reasonableness,	  or	  perhaps	  more	  appropriately	  a	  cautious	  and	  prudent	  form	  of	  rationality,	  which,	  as	  he	  says,	  is	  	  consistent	  with	  agents’	  concern	  for	  their	  own	  prudent	  self-­‐interest.	  Yet	  such	  self-­‐interest	  also	  has	  to	  be	  an	  enlightened	  self-­‐interest	  (…).	  We	  are	  seeking	  to	  define	  a	  deliberative	  and	  enlightened	  prudence’	  (pp.	  102-­‐103).	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Thus	  choice	  in	  deliberative	  rationality	  is	  still	  the	  result	  of	  prudent,	  instrumental	  reasoning,	  yet	  it	  needs	  to	  be	  seen	  as	  ‘arising	  from	  deliberation’	  (p.	  xiii).	  But	  how	  does	  this	  combination	  work	  and	  what	  is	  it	  intended	  to	  achieve?	  There	  are	  two	  aspects	  to	  Weale’s	  deliberative	  rationality,	  which	  are	  meant	  to	  address	  two	  separate	  problems	  besetting	  traditional	  contractarian	  views	  of	  rationality.	  One	  is	  the	  issue	  raised,	  for	  instance,	  by	  Barry	  against	  mutual	  advantage	  theories	  of	  justice,	  suggesting	  that	  they	  suffer	  from	  deep	  incoherence:	  ‘the	  essence	  of	  justice	  as	  mutual	  advantage	  in	  all	  its	  forms	  is	  that	  people	  do	  not	  give-­‐up	  the	  single-­‐minded	  pursuit	  of	  their	  ends,	  be	  they	  self-­‐interested	  or	  otherwise’	  (Barry,	  1995,	  p.	  37).	  For	  Barry,	  there	  is	  no	  solution	  to	  Hobbes’s	  Foole;	  the	  idea	  of	  mutual	  advantage	  is	  either	  too	  fragile	  or	  unfeasible	  as	  a	  basis	  for	  morality	  and	  justice,	  because	  based	  on	  the	  self-­‐defeating	  logic	  of	  rational	  calculation.12	  Weale’s	  deliberative	  rationality	  proposes	  to	  introduce	  a	  dose	  of	  ‘minimally	  moralized’	  prudence	  in	  the	  reasoning	  of	  the	  agents,	  so	  to	  improve	  their	  long-­‐sightedness	  and	  offset	  problems	  of	  akrasia.	  This	  is	  achieved	  through	  what	  Weale	  calls	  ‘reflective	  distance’,	  the	  ability	  of	  the	  agents	  to	  ‘re-­‐model’	  the	  collective	  action	  problem	  that	  they	  are	  facing:	  	  By	  definition,	  prudent	  individuals	  will	  play	  defect	  in	  an	  orthodox	  prisoner’s	  dilemma.	  By	  contrast,	  prudent	  and	  reflective	  individuals	  negotiating	  an	  empirical	  social	  contract	  will	  seek	  to	  construct	  a	  different	  game	  in	  which	  it	  is	  no	  longer	  prudent	  to	  play	  defect	  but	  instead	  play	  cooperatively	  	  as	  the	  condition	  for	  realizing	  joint	  gains.	  (p.	  103)	  There	  is	  another	  feature	  of	  deliberative	  rationality13	  –	  this	  being	  the	  capacity	  to	  articulate	  reasons	  for	  action,	  therefore	  giving	  oneself	  ‘normative	  self-­‐direction’	  (pp.	  107-­‐108)	  –	  that	  also	  contributes	  to	  the	  kind	  of	  ‘enlightened	  prudence’	  Weale	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thinks	  is	  needed	  in	  place	  of	  rational	  utility	  calculation.	  This	  is	  an	  important	  feature	  not	  only	  to	  stabilize	  one’s	  behaviour	  in	  relation	  to	  both	  ‘present	  desires’	  and	  ‘present	  desires	  for	  one’s	  own	  future’	  (p.	  24),	  but	  also	  to	  give	  assurance	  to	  others	  about	  one’s	  own	  commitments.	  The	  second	  aspect	  of	  deliberative	  rationality	  that	  is	  intended	  to	  offset	  the	  shortcomings	  of	  the	  utility	  maximising	  view	  is	  its	  ‘defeasibility’	  (108-­‐110).	  Whereas	  reflective	  and	  self-­‐directing	  rationality	  invites	  towards	  prudence,	  defeasible	  rationality	  asks	  for	  caution.	  To	  put	  it	  bluntly,	  human	  rationality	  is	  not	  infallible:	  agents	  cannot	  be	  certain	  of	  the	  outcome	  of	  theirs	  or	  other’s	  action,	  nor	  can	  they	  be	  sure	  of	  the	  best	  way	  of	  pursuing	  their	  ends,	  nor	  finally	  can	  they	  fully	  rely	  on	  their	  own	  rational	  capacity	  to	  draw	  correct	  consequences	  from	  given	  premises	  (p.	  28).	  At	  times,	  Weale	  seems	  to	  suggest	  that	  what	  should	  make	  us	  cautious	  about	  rationality	  is	  its	  defeasibility	  in	  a	  technical	  sense,	  but	  I	  think	  his	  analysis	  of	  the	  ‘fallibility’	  of	  human	  reason	  (p.	  26)	  is	  more	  intricate	  and	  multi-­‐faced.	  Weale	  relies	  on	  recent	  specialized	  literature	  on	  non-­‐monotonic	  logic,	  which	  analyses	  everyday	  life	  inferences	  based	  on	  forms	  of	  reasoning	  that	  are	  only	  tentative,	  relying	  on	  most-­‐likely	  types	  of	  explanations	  (like	  abductive	  reasoning),	  default	  kinds	  of	  logic,	  and	  taxonomic	  generalizations,	  all	  of	  which	  are	  ‘vulnerable	  to	  new	  information’	  (p.	  108)	  and	  therefore	  subject	  to	  belief	  revision.	  Classical	  logic	  is	  monotonic,	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  its	  logical	  conclusions	  cannot	  be	  pre-­‐empted	  by	  the	  addition	  of	  new	  premises.	  The	  inferences	  of	  non-­‐monotonic	  logic,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  are	  defeasible	  in	  the	  double	  sense	  that	  they	  can	  be	  overturned	  (i.e.	  defeated)	  by	  new	  evidence	  and	  that	  they	  are	  formulated	  according	  to	  a	  tentative,	  fallibilist	  logic	  (i.e.	  defeasible	  in	  principle),	  and	  therefore	  require	  ‘built-­‐in	  correction	  mechanisms’	  (p.	  26;	  cf.	  pp.	  109-­‐110).	  Defeasibility	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applies	  to	  both	  theoretical	  and	  practical	  rationality;	  however,	  it	  has	  particular	  causes	  and	  consequences	  for	  practical	  reason,	  which	  may	  need	  special	  consideration	  in	  setting	  up	  the	  social	  contract.	  Although	  a	  common	  reason	  for	  defeasibility	  is	  the	  open-­‐textured	  nature	  of	  knowledge,	  which	  continuously	  challenges	  the	  closed-­‐world-­‐assumption	  on	  which	  we	  rely	  for	  most	  of	  our	  common	  inferences;	  practical	  reasoning	  must	  deal	  with	  a	  more	  specific	  sense	  in	  which	  the	  knowledge	  of	  intentional	  human	  action	  is	  open-­‐textured.	  This	  is	  a	  function	  of	  the	  ‘inventive	  capacity’	  and	  creativity	  that	  characterises	  human	  agents	  (pp.	  25-­‐26,	  and	  pp.	  106-­‐107),	  and	  such	  capacities	  need	  to	  be	  factored	  in	  when	  we	  try	  to	  understand	  human	  actions	  and	  their	  consequences.	  The	  other	  two	  constitutive	  features	  of	  deliberative	  rationality	  mentioned	  by	  Weale	  –	  deliberative	  competence	  and	  the	  ability	  to	  frame	  and	  understand	  specificity	  (pp.	  104-­‐107)	  –	  have	  a	  particular	  importance	  in	  this	  context,	  since	  the	  open-­‐textured	  character	  of	  knowledge	  requires	  close	  attention	  to	  the	  logic	  of	  appropriateness,	  meaning	  that	  agreements	  about	  general	  principles	  or	  basic	  arrangements	  that	  are	  reached	  at	  the	  social	  contract	  level	  need	  to	  be	  ‘suited	  to	  the	  specific	  conditions	  under	  which	  the	  regime	  has	  to	  operate’	  (p.	  110).	  This	  logic	  of	  specification	  and	  appropriateness	  is	  what,	  if	  I	  interpret	  Weale’s	  argument	  correctly,	  should	  inform	  practical	  public	  reason	  in	  a	  deliberative	  democracy	  (pp.	  118-­‐27).	  Weale	  describes	  the	  core	  of	  public	  reason	  as	  the	  search	  for	  ‘agreed	  middle	  premises	  in	  a	  practical	  syllogism’	  (p.	  119),	  and	  therefore	  a	  way	  of	  specifying	  public	  goals	  mainly	  through	  procedural	  means	  (p.	  122).14	  Besides	  its	  defeasibility	  and	  open-­‐texture,	  there	  is	  a	  third	  reason	  for	  being	  cautious	  about	  our	  rationality.	  This	  is	  linked	  to	  the	  more	  internal	  limits	  of	  our	  reasoning	  capacities,	  and	  to	  the	  way	  in	  which	  we	  make	  rational	  decisions.	  Weale	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treats	  this	  aspect	  mainly	  in	  terms	  of	  ‘bounded’	  rationality	  (pp.	  24-­‐26),	  but	  one	  could	  extend	  such	  discussion	  to	  other	  forms	  of	  non-­‐canonical	  theories	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  rationality	  and	  behaviour,	  such	  as	  Prospect	  theory	  (Kahneman,	  2011,	  pp.	  288-­‐78).	  These	  theories	  challenge	  expected	  utility	  conceptions	  of	  rationality	  from	  a	  number	  of	  important	  perspectives,	  like	  the	  effect	  of	  the	  asymmetric	  perception	  of	  losses	  and	  gains;	  the	  effect	  of	  framing	  and	  understanding	  on	  our	  preferences,	  thus	  producing	  value	  reversal;	  the	  importance	  of	  heuristics	  and	  related	  choice	  biases,	  and	  the	  role	  of	  ex-­‐ante	  expectations	  and	  ex-­‐post	  valuations	  in	  assessing	  choices	  and	  states	  of	  affairs	  (cf.	  Elster,	  2007,	  pp.	  214-­‐31).	  To	  sum	  up,	  Weale’s	  deliberative	  rationality	  distinguishes	  itself	  from	  traditional	  contractarian	  views	  in	  so	  far	  as	  it	  has	  a	  stronger	  capacity	  for	  foresight	  and	  commitment	  (it’s	  more	  prudent)	  and	  it	  takes	  seriously	  its	  fallibility	  (it’s	  more	  cautious).	  But	  crucially,	  Weale	  seems	  to	  suggest	  that	  the	  resources	  for	  such	  an	  ‘enlightened	  prudence,’	  with	  in-­‐built	  self-­‐correcting	  mechanisms,	  can	  only	  come	  from	  the	  practice	  of	  deliberation,	  and	  cannot	  be	  sustained	  by	  a	  solipsistic	  conception	  of	  rationality	  or	  indeed	  reasonableness.	  This	  makes	  the	  cultivation	  of	  such	  rationality	  depend	  on	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  functioning	  democratic	  society	  with	  strong	  institutions,	  practices	  of	  deliberation,	  and	  a	  particular	  conceptions	  of	  public	  reasoning,	  thus	  supporting	  his	  argument	  for	  democratic	  justice.	  In	  consideration	  of	  the	  reflective	  and	  fallible	  characters	  of	  rationality,	  Weale	  states	  that	  ‘there	  is	  much	  room	  for	  collective	  deliberative	  rationality’	  (p.	  28,	  emphasis	  added).	  	  Contractual	  legitimacy	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We	  come	  now	  to	  the	  question	  of	  legitimacy.	  Arguably,	  the	  most	  compelling	  aspect	  of	  social	  contract	  theories	  in	  the	  modern	  imaginary	  is	  that	  they	  rest	  on	  the	  idea	  that	  legitimate	  social	  arrangements	  should	  be	  consensual.	  In	  other	  words,	  they	  should	  be	  positively	  accepted,	  whether	  actually,	  tacitly,	  or	  hypothetically,	  by	  those	  subject	  to	  them.	  The	  problem	  of	  consent,	  however,	  has	  never	  been	  an	  easy	  one	  to	  solve	  for	  contract	  theories.	  It	  is	  common	  to	  think	  that	  the	  main	  criticism	  to	  early	  modern	  theories	  of	  social	  contract	  –	  which	  were	  primarily	  concerned	  with	  political	  obligation	  rather	  than	  justice	  –	  was	  that	  they	  were	  historically	  implausible.	  Particularly	  in	  the	  case	  of	  David	  Hume,	  this	  is	  a	  crude	  oversimplification,	  which	  does	  not	  need	  to	  concern	  us	  here,	  also	  because	  modern	  social	  contract	  theories	  present	  agreement	  as	  hypothetical	  and	  therefore	  escape	  that	  sort	  of	  criticism.	  But	  do	  they	  solve	  the	  problem	  of	  consent?	  Theories	  of	  the	  contractualist	  variety	  tend	  to	  present	  hypothetical	  consent	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  agreement	  is	  not	  so	  much	  a	  voluntary	  act	  between	  different	  agents,	  but	  the	  separate	  recognition	  that	  this	  is	  a	  demand	  of	  reason,	  in	  terms	  of	  either	  fairness,	  impartiality,	  or	  moral	  duty:	  it	  is	  reason	  and	  not	  volition	  that	  makes	  the	  real	  difference.	  Mutual	  advantage	  theories,	  particularly	  of	  the	  ‘empirical’	  variety,	  such	  as	  Weale’s	  proposes	  to	  be,	  have	  therefore	  an	  important	  advantage	  here,	  because	  they	  can	  suggest	  that	  voluntary	  adhesion,	  whatever	  form	  this	  may	  take,	  does	  some	  real	  work	  in	  sanctioning	  agreement.	  Nonetheless,	  claiming	  that	  people	  have	  consented	  to	  the	  contract	  may	  not	  be	  enough.	  In	  order	  for	  these	  theories	  to	  meet	  the	  standard	  requirements	  of	  legitimacy,	  they	  also	  need	  to	  show	  that	  the	  agents	  have	  consented	  freely	  to	  it,	  and	  that	  the	  contract	  they	  have	  agreed	  to	  does	  not	  put	  them	  in	  a	  situation	  of	  utter	  disadvantage.	  The	  problem	  for	  mutual	  advantage	  theories	  is	  how	  to	  deal	  with	  the	  differential	  of	  threat	  advantage,	  since	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overwhelming	  power	  unbalance	  can	  put	  people	  in	  a	  situation	  in	  which	  they	  feel	  they	  cannot	  but	  consent.	  In	  such	  a	  case,	  assent	  provides	  no	  legitimacy.	  Weale	  is	  fully	  aware	  of	  this	  problem.	  He	  admits	  that,	  even	  though	  one	  can	  describe	  social	  order	  and	  institutions	  as	  implicit	  (and	  occasionally	  explicit)	  forms	  of	  social	  contracts,	  these	  can	  embody	  unjust	  social	  relations	  (pp.	  19-­‐20,	  and	  31-­‐32).	  These	  social	  orders	  may	  even	  meet	  the	  conditions	  of	  political	  legitimacy	  and	  stability,	  but	  fail	  the	  test	  of	  social	  justice,	  because	  they	  ‘embody	  unjustifiable	  patterns	  of	  social	  and	  economy	  relations’	  (p.	  32).	  This	  is	  typically	  the	  result	  of	  asymmetric	  power	  relations	  at	  the	  pre-­‐contractual	  stage,	  or,	  looked	  at	  from	  the	  post-­‐contractual	  perspective,	  of	  the	  inability	  of	  the	  disadvantaged	  members	  to	  see	  ‘the	  objective	  possibilities	  of	  advance	  that	  were	  latently	  present’	  (p.	  32).	  But	  mutual	  advantage	  theories	  take	  seriously	  the	  power	  asymmetries	  at	  the	  pre-­‐agreement	  stage,	  and	  do	  not	  reject	  in	  principle	  the	  ability	  of	  the	  agents	  to	  make	  good	  their	  threat	  advantage	  –	  and	  so	  does	  Weale’s	  theory.	  In	  this	  case,	  the	  solution	  lies	  in	  what	  Weale	  describes	  as	  one	  of	  the	  inspiring	  ideas	  of	  his	  theory.	  He	  takes	  his	  cue	  from	  John	  Stuart	  Mill:	  The	  ancient	  republics,	  being	  grounded	  in	  some	  kind	  of	  mutual	  compact,	  or	  at	  any	  rate	  formed	  by	  an	  union	  of	  persons	  of	  not	  very	  unequal	  strength,	  afforded,	  in	  consequence,	  the	  first	  instance	  of	  a	  portion	  of	  human	  relations	  fenced	  around,	  and	  placed	  under	  the	  dominion	  of	  another	  law	  
than	  that	  of	  force	  (cited	  at	  p.	  5,	  emphases	  added)	  	  	   Weale	  embraces	  Mill’s	  historical	  characterization	  of	  ancient	  republics	  as	  being	  founded	  on	  the	  power	  of	  law	  rather	  than	  force,	  and	  takes	  this	  to	  be	  the	  key	  feature	  of	  his	  contractarian	  view	  of	  democratic	  justice.	  He	  suggests	  that	  the	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fundamental	  distinction	  between	  just	  and	  unjust	  social	  contracts	  lies	  in	  the	  
condition	  of	  rough	  equality	  of	  power	  (and	  therefore	  of	  rough	  threat	  advantage)	  at	  the	  pre-­‐contractual	  stage.	  It	  is	  such	  a	  condition	  that	  makes	  it	  possible	  for	  the	  agents	  to	  agree	  freely	  to	  the	  terms	  of	  the	  contract,	  and	  therefore	  for	  consent	  to	  have	  a	  true	  legitimating	  role:	  ‘the	  common	  rules	  that	  protect	  the	  public	  interests	  of	  a	  society	  reflect	  the	  approximate	  equality	  of	  power	  of	  its	  members’	  (p.	  23).	  From	  the	  (empirical)	  condition	  of	  rough	  equality	  –	  where	  threat	  advantage	  may	  be	  asymmetrical	  but	  not	  overwhelmingly	  so	  –	  it	  follows	  that	  democratic	  justice	  supports	  a	  conception	  of	  ‘equality	  of	  status	  or	  standing	  within	  the	  political	  system,	  rather	  than	  an	  entitlement	  to	  any	  particular	  share	  …	  to	  available	  goods	  and	  services’	  (p.	  23).	  The	  latter	  can	  indeed	  be	  sensitive	  to	  the	  asymmetries	  of	  threat	  advantage,	  as	  long	  as	  inequality	  over	  access	  and	  command	  of	  resources	  do	  not	  become	  too	  ‘extreme’;	  since	  extreme	  disparities	  would	  undercut	  the	  motive	  for	  the	  relatively	  disadvantaged	  to	  agree	  to	  the	  contract.	  Differences	  in	  distribution	  are	  therefore	  subject	  to	  a	  relative	  limit,	  but	  the	  precise	  scope	  of	  such	  a	  limit	  is	  not	  part	  of	  the	  contract	  	  (p.	  24).	  	   Besides	  making	  the	  social	  contract	  just,	  the	  condition	  of	  rough	  equality	  establishes	  its	  democratic	  credentials.	  Here,	  or	  so	  it	  seems	  to	  me,	  Weale	  appeals	  to	  two	  different	  senses	  of	  democratic	  equality.	  One	  is	  the	  equality	  of	  political	  status,	  that	  is:	  the	  equality	  of	  citizens	  in	  a	  constituted	  democratic	  society;	  and	  Weale	  suggests	  that	  such	  equality	  ‘is	  the	  power	  to	  help	  shape	  the	  social	  contract	  
through	  the	  political	  relations	  of	  the	  institutions	  of	  governance	  in	  a	  society’	  (p.	  24,	  emphasis	  added).	  It	  follows	  that	  political	  democracy	  is	  a	  co-­‐requisite	  for	  justice.	  The	  other	  sense	  of	  democratic	  equality	  derives	  from	  the	  fact	  that	  a	  condition	  of	  rough	  equality	  is	  constitutive	  of	  a	  society	  based	  on	  a	  just	  social	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contract:	  in	  this	  sense,	  democratic	  is	  meant	  in	  the	  broad	  social	  sense	  of	  rough	  equality	  of	  power,	  and	  not	  in	  the	  more	  specific	  political	  sense.	  This	  may	  also	  explain	  the	  fact	  that	  Weale	  takes	  common	  pool	  resources	  regimes	  as	  a	  model	  for	  the	  democratic	  contract	  (see	  below).	  	   The	  condition	  of	  rough	  equality,	  finally,	  helps	  also	  to	  define	  the	  fundamental	  conception	  of	  society	  that	  underwrites	  Weale’s	  contractarian	  democratic	  justice.	  Such	  a	  society	  is	  both	  competitive	  and	  cooperative;	  its	  principles	  and	  operations	  need	  to	  manage	  the	  tension	  between	  the	  individuals’	  self-­‐defined	  permanent	  interests	  and	  the	  common	  interest,	  defined	  as	  the	  ‘shared	  interest	  of	  individuals	  taken	  severally’	  (p.	  28):	  a	  middle	  way	  between	  individualism	  and	  collectivism	  (pp.	  28-­‐	  30).	  	  
Friendly	  Fire	  However	  abridged,	  I	  hope	  that	  my	  account	  of	  the	  book	  and	  of	  Weale’s	  theory	  of	  the	  democratic	  social	  contract	  conveys	  the	  breath	  of	  issues	  covered	  by	  the	  book,	  and	  the	  theoretical	  depth	  and	  complexity	  of	  some	  of	  its	  arguments.	  The	  book	  is	  worth	  reading	  not	  only	  for	  the	  theory	  it	  proposes,	  but	  also	  for	  the	  clear	  and	  illuminatingly	  synoptic	  way	  in	  which	  Weale	  discusses	  many	  issues,	  some	  of	  which	  I	  had	  no	  space	  to	  cover.	  But,	  ultimately,	  Weale’s	  contribution	  will	  be	  judged	  by	  his	  own	  standards:	  does	  his	  version	  of	  the	  social	  contract	  theory	  overcomes	  the	  limits	  he	  himself	  had	  previously	  recognized	  in	  such	  theories?	  	  The	  present	  symposium	  puts	  Weale’s	  theory	  to	  the	  test.	  The	  contributors	  to	  the	  symposium	  subject	  the	  book	  to	  a	  volley	  of	  friendly	  fire.	  Most	  of	  the	  criticisms	  are	  offered	  from	  an	  amicable	  perspective	  –	  sympathetic	  to	  either	  the	  overall	  approach	  or	  to	  the	  underlying	  intentions	  of	  the	  book,	  or	  to	  some	  of	  its	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substantive	  principles	  and	  arguments.	  However	  friendly,	  there	  is	  some	  fire	  from	  the	  contributors	  (with	  friends	  like	  these	  …).	  One	  issue	  that	  comes	  under	  criticism	  is	  whether	  Weale’s	  theory	  succeeds	  in	  its	  constructivists	  purposes.	  In	  different	  ways,	  Matt	  Matravers,	  Jeffrey	  Howard,	  and	  Chiara	  Cordelli	  question	  it.	  Although,	  each	  of	  them	  tend	  to	  push	  Weale	  in	  different	  directions,	  all	  of	  them	  hone	  in	  on	  the	  role	  that	  equality	  plays	  as	  either	  a	  moral	  or	  an	  empirical	  condition	  for	  his	  contractual	  theory.	  A	  similar	  point	  with	  relation	  to	  the	  role	  of	  equality	  is	  raised	  by	  Ian	  O’Flynn,	  who	  discusses	  it	  in	  relation	  to	  Weale’s	  understanding	  of	  deliberation,	  and	  whether	  Weale	  may	  need	  a	  stronger	  conception	  of	  it,	  for	  engendering	  and	  stabilising	  a	  sense	  of	  justice.	  Finally,	  Christopher	  Bertram	  engages	  Weale	  on	  his	  principles	  of	  economic	  justice,	  first	  on	  the	  ground	  that	  the	  common	  pool	  resources	  regimes,	  is	  too	  arbitrary	  and	  idiosyncratic	  as	  a	  model	  on	  which	  to	  base	  his	  full-­‐fruits	  principle;	  and	  secondly	  because	  there	  are	  too	  many	  logical	  and	  practical	  difficulties	  in	  matching	  reward	  to	  marginal	  utility	  in	  the	  ‘great	  society.’	  These	  are	  some	  of	  the	  critical	  points	  (amid	  genuine	  praise)	  raised	  by	  the	  contributors	  to	  this	  symposium.	  At	  the	  end,	  Weale	  offers	  his	  considerate	  reply.	  The	  readers	  will	  have	  to	  make	  their	  own	  mind	  on	  the	  points	  of	  contention.	  But	  before	  concluding	  this	  introduction,	  I	  wish	  to	  offer	  some	  small	  ammunition	  of	  my	  own	  for	  a	  critical	  assessment	  of	  Weale’s	  project.	  I	  shall	  limit	  myself	  to	  a	  point	  of	  method	  and	  one	  of	  substance.	  On	  the	  issue	  of	  method.	  A	  distinctive	  point	  of	  Weale’s	  position	  is	  his	  use	  of	  the	  ‘empirical’	  approach.	  There	  are	  several	  reasons	  for	  this,	  one	  of	  which	  is	  that,	  by	  identifying	  the	  logic	  of	  the	  social	  contract	  with	  that	  of	  actual	  societies,	  it	  may	  result	  easier	  to	  link	  the	  theory	  with	  ‘an	  understanding	  of	  democratic	  practice’	  (p.	  14).	  But	  the	  main	  reason	  is	  to	  overcome	  the	  indeterminacy	  and	  circularity	  that	  
	   23	  
beset	  a	  priori	  approaches	  to	  social	  justice,	  relying	  on	  thought	  experiments	  whose	  pre-­‐conditions	  are	  already	  determined	  by	  some	  background	  assumption	  (p.	  32).	  By	  identifying	  empirical	  cases,	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  condition	  of	  similar	  bargaining	  advantages,	  one	  is	  able	  to	  specify,	  albeit	  in	  a	  stylized	  form,	  the	  characteristic	  of	  a	  just	  social	  contract:	  its	  main	  logic.	  In	  Barry’s	  version	  of	  the	  ‘empirical’	  method	  (1998,	  pp.	  99-­‐111;	  and	  195-­‐213),	  which	  Weale	  takes	  as	  inspiration,	  the	  recourse	  to	  actual	  social	  arrangements	  functions	  as	  a	  control	  devise	  to	  check	  both	  the	  content	  of	  what	  Barry	  calls	  the	  ‘conditions	  of	  impartiality’	  and	  to	  ascertain	  how	  they	  can	  be	  obtained	  and	  sustained.	  But	  in	  Weale’s	  version,	  the	  empirical	  cases	  stand	  on	  their	  own.	  In	  this	  respect,	  it	  is	  probably	  more	  appropriate	  to	  assume	  that	  Weale’s	  ‘empirical’	  approach	  is	  closer	  to	  what	  Amartya	  Sen	  has	  called	  the	  ‘comparative’	  approach	  (2009,	  pp.	  87-­‐113),	  also	  mentioned	  by	  Weale	  as	  having	  similarities	  with	  his	  own	  (pp.	  33-­‐34).	  However,	  if	  one	  takes	  Sen’s	  ‘comparative’	  approach	  seriously,	  a	  number	  of	  differences	  emerge.	  First,	  Sen	  suggests	  that	  our	  judgements	  in	  terms	  of	  social	  justice	  can	  only	  be	  comparative,	  while	  the	  ‘transcendental’	  –	  i.e.	  a	  priori	  –	  is	  neither	  sufficient	  nor	  necessary	  (Sen,	  2009,	  pp.	  96-­‐105).	  Adopting	  a	  ‘comparative’	  approach	  raises	  questions	  on	  Weale’s	  attempt	  to	  identify	  a	  contractarian	  logic	  through	  the	  use	  of	  a	  ‘model’	  drawn	  from	  empirical	  cases.	  The	  ‘model’	  risks	  being	  like	  a	  device	  of	  representation;	  while	  Sen’s	  ‘comparative’	  approach	  requires	  that	  we	  try	  to	  make	  comparisons	  between	  two	  or	  more	  of	  our	  empirical	  cases	  (and	  their	  logic)	  in	  order	  to	  arrive	  at	  our	  judgements	  about	  relative	  justice	  or	  injustice.	  The	  second	  difference	  is	  that,	  whereas	  Weale’s	  ‘empirical’	  approach	  is	  meant	  to	  give	  more	  specificity	  to	  the	  contractual	  principles;	  Sen’s	  ‘comparative’	  method	  suggests	  that	  ‘incompleteness’	  is	  an	  inevitable	  character	  of	  our	  judgements	  of	  social	  justice:	  ‘A	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systematic	  theory	  of	  comparative	  justice	  does	  not	  need,	  nor	  does	  it	  necessarily	  yield,	  an	  answer	  to	  the	  question	  “what	  is	  a	  just	  society?”’	  (Sen,	  2009,	  p.	  105).	  Finally,	  Sen	  suggests	  that	  there	  is	  an	  important	  way	  in	  which	  the	  ‘comparative’	  method	  is	  linked	  to	  impartiality,	  though	  he	  tends	  to	  conceive	  this	  more	  as	  a	  combination	  of	  what	  he	  calls	  ‘closed’	  impartiality	  (‘the	  man	  within	  the	  breast’)	  and	  ‘open’	  impartiality	  (the	  ‘spectator	  at	  a	  distance’)	  (Sen,	  2009,	  pp.	  124-­‐52).	  This	  would	  seem	  a	  socialized,	  rather	  than	  moralized	  conception	  of	  impartiality,	  which	  may	  have	  strong	  affinities	  with	  Weale’s	  own	  conception	  of	  deliberative	  rationality,	  but	  may	  seriously	  undermine	  his	  mutual	  advantage	  conception	  of	  the	  social	  contract	  (cf.	  Sen,	  2009,	  pp.	  194-­‐207).	  In	  all	  these	  respects,	  a	  ‘comparative’	  approach	  pushes	  back	  from	  contract	  to	  the	  pluralism	  of	  our	  intuitions.	  My	  final	  point	  concerns	  the	  philosophical	  anthropology	  of	  the	  social	  contract	  argument.	  I	  mentioned	  at	  the	  start,	  that	  the	  spirit	  of	  the	  book	  is	  best	  captured	  by	  its	  last	  sentence,	  where	  it	  is	  suggested	  that	  ‘individuals	  can	  be	  for	  themselves;	  but	  they	  will	  never	  be	  only	  for	  themselves’	  (p.	  244).	  The	  second	  part	  of	  the	  sentence	  sounds	  perhaps	  odd	  for	  a	  contractarian	  theory	  of	  mutual	  advantage,	  where	  much	  of	  the	  work	  is	  done	  by	  the	  prudent	  rationality	  of	  agents	  whose	  main	  incentive	  for	  social	  cooperation	  is	  their	  own	  advantage.	  So,	  in	  what	  sense	  are	  these	  individuals	  not	  only	  for	  themselves?	  It	  could	  be	  argued	  that	  this	  should	  be	  seen	  as	  the	  end-­‐result	  of	  an	  internalization	  process,	  which	  Weale	  describes	  in	  the	  last	  chapter	  on	  the	  sense	  of	  justice.	  But	  there	  are	  several	  other	  moments	  in	  Weale’s	  analysis	  where	  he	  suggests	  that	  individuals	  may	  never	  be	  for	  themselves:	  the	  equality	  condition	  as	  a	  pre-­‐requisite	  for	  a	  just	  social	  contract;	  the	  suggestion	  that	  a	  contract	  of	  mutual	  advantage	  implies	  that	  agents	  need	  to	  be	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aware	  of	  their	  shared	  interests;	  or	  the	  collective	  nature	  of	  deliberative	  rationality.	  	  The	  same	  point	  can	  be	  put	  in	  another	  way.	  It	  may	  be	  remembered	  that	  for	  Weale	  reflective	  distance	  allows	  agents	  to	  remodel	  their	  social	  situation	  in	  a	  way	  to	  provide	  different	  incentives	  for	  collective	  action.	  In	  the	  game-­‐theoretic	  terms	  used	  by	  Weale,	  there	  is	  a	  change	  in	  the	  game	  pay-­‐offs;	  but,	  as	  he	  notices,	  this	  is	  not	  a	  ‘move	  within	  the	  game’,	  rather	  this	  is	  playing	  a	  ‘different	  game’	  (p.	  103).	  In	  
Justice	  as	  Impartiality,	  Barry	  makes	  a	  similar	  suggestion,	  claiming	  that	  mutual	  advantage	  conceptions	  are	  unstable	  because	  they	  have	  the	  structure	  of	  a	  prisoner’s	  dilemma,	  while	  the	  stability	  of	  justice	  as	  impartiality	  derives	  form	  it	  having	  an	  assurance	  game	  structure	  (Barry,	  1995,	  p.	  51).	  Reflecting	  on	  the	  ‘difficulties	  of	  acting	  together’	  in	  the	  circumstances	  of	  politics,	  Jeremy	  Waldron	  suggests	  that	  these	  are	  captured	  neither	  by	  prisoner’s	  dilemma	  nor	  by	  coordination	  games,	  but	  by	  ‘partial	  conflict	  coordination	  problems’	  like	  the	  battle	  of	  the	  sexes	  (Waldron,	  1999,	  pp.	  103-­‐104).	  Weale	  has	  the	  same	  game	  in	  mind,	  when	  he	  suggests	  that	  agents	  remodel	  their	  decisions	  in	  function	  of	  their	  realization	  that	  the	  game	  they	  should	  play	  is	  one	  where	  ‘shared	  action	  is	  preferred	  by	  each	  party	  to	  separate	  action’	  (p.	  103).	  This	  sounds	  more	  like	  Rousseau	  than	  Hobbes.	  	  It	  seems	  to	  me	  that	  in	  order	  to	  understand	  the	  fragility,	  but	  also	  the	  resilience	  of	  social	  cooperation,	  we	  need	  to	  dig	  deeper	  in	  both	  the	  idea	  of	  mutuality	  and	  trust.	  As	  Charles	  Taylor	  has	  argued,	  ‘mutual	  respect	  and	  mutual	  service	  of	  the	  individuals	  who	  make	  up	  society’	  (2004,	  p.12	  and	  passim	  pp.	  3-­‐22)	  are	  at	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  ‘moral	  order’	  that	  in	  the	  modern	  imaginary	  has	  supplanted	  that	  of	  the	  hierarchical	  complementarity	  of	  traditional	  societies.	  In	  this	  respect,	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modern	  mutuality	  is	  egalitarian	  and	  mainly	  directed	  towards	  our	  ordinary	  goals	  in	  life:	  security	  and	  prosperity.	  But	  it	  comes	  in	  different	  shades.	  We	  would	  have	  a	  distorted	  view	  if	  we	  simply	  read	  it	  in	  individualistic	  terms,	  while	  the	  new	  individualism	  has	  ‘its	  inevitable	  flip	  side	  a	  new	  understanding	  of	  sociality,	  the	  society	  of	  mutual	  benefit,	  whose	  functional	  differentiation	  are	  ultimately	  contingent	  and	  whose	  members	  are	  fundamentally	  equal’	  (Taylor,	  2004,	  p.	  18).	  For	  Taylor	  too,	  the	  problem	  is	  to	  move	  from	  Hobbes’s	  prisoner	  dilemma	  to	  the	  more	  nuanced	  social	  psychology	  of	  Tocqueville.	  An	  understanding	  of	  the	  working	  of	  trust	  (cf.	  Hollis,	  1998),	  which	  both	  Locke	  and	  Hegel	  –	  each	  in	  his	  own	  way	  –	  thought	  to	  be	  the	  ‘bond’	  of	  society,	  is	  no	  less	  important	  for	  appreciating	  how	  we	  can	  be	  for	  ourselves,	  but	  never	  only	  for	  ourselves:	  how	  it	  is,	  in	  Weale’s	  view,	  that	  ‘a	  strong	  individualism	  also	  requires	  collective	  provisions	  for	  common	  interests’	  (p.	  30).	  Trust	  and	  sociality	  within	  reason.	  In	  this	  sense,	  a	  contract	  of	  
mutual	  advantage	  may	  require	  some	  conception	  of	  commonality	  from	  the	  start.	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  1	  I	  wish	  to	  thank	  all	  participants	  to	  the	  Exeter	  symposium	  for	  helping	  me	  to	  appreciate	  the	  arguments	  of	  the	  book,	  and	  Albert	  Weale	  for	  his	  replies	  and	  explanations.	  I	  also	  wish	  to	  thank	  Chiara	  Cordelli	  and	  two	  anonymous	  referees	  for	  their	  useful	  comments.	  The	  usual	  disclaimers	  apply.	  2	  Parenthetical	  references	  to	  page	  numbers,	  where	  there	  is	  no	  other	  indication,	  are	  to	  this	  book.	  3	  For	  reasons	  of	  space,	  I	  cannot	  deal	  with	  this	  important	  element	  of	  Weale’s	  book	  in	  this	  introduction.	  Of	  the	  contributions	  to	  this	  debate,	  Chris	  Bertram’s	  is	  the	  one	  that	  engages	  with	  it	  more	  closely,	  and	  his	  and	  Weale’s	  reply	  may	  further	  clarify	  the	  issues	  involved	  for	  the	  reader	  of	  this	  symposium.	  But,	  in	  brief,	  Weale’s	  principle	  of	  economic	  justice	  aims	  to	  avoid	  both	  an	  individualist	  and	  pre-­‐contractual	  (Lockean,	  or	  Nozikian)	  right	  to	  appropriate	  the	  natural	  world;	  and	  a	  collectivist,	  post-­‐contractual	  (in	  Weale’s	  view	  Rawlsian)	  understanding	  of	  natural	  talents	  and	  resources	  as	  a	  common	  asset.	  For	  Weale,	  both	  property	  rights	  and	  collective	  control	  derive	  from	  the	  democratic	  contract.	  This	  is	  possible	  by	  starting	  from	  a	  situation	  where	  everyone	  enjoys	  Hohfeldian	  liberty-­‐rights.	  The	  logic	  of	  mutual	  advantage,	  which	  includes	  the	  idea	  of	  ‘equal	  threat-­‐advantage’	  lead	  to	  the	  abridgement	  of	  the	  Hohfeldian	  liberties	  for	  contractually	  agreed	  claim-­‐rights,	  as	  long	  as	  people	  can	  maintain	  the	  full-­‐fruits	  entitlement	  for	  the	  product	  of	  their	  labour,	  once	  taking	  account	  of	  externalities	  and	  the	  social	  aspects	  of	  production	  (pp.	  65-­‐78).	  Why	  to	  start	  from	  the	  Hohfeldian	  liberty-­‐rights	  is,	  however,	  a	  mute	  point	  in	  the	  theory.	  	  4	  Weale	  understands	  reciprocity	  not	  as	  that	  of	  a	  bilateral	  exchange,	  but	  as	  a	  more	  generalized	  reciprocity,	  which	  is	  conditional	  to	  ‘enough	  others’	  being	  willing	  to	  act	  cooperatively	  (p.	  235).	  Weale	  is	  indebted	  to	  Rawls	  in	  his	  treatment	  of	  the	  sense	  of	  justice,	  and	  there	  is	  some	  affinity	  between	  his	  discussion	  of	  reciprocity,	  as	  the	  core	  of	  a	  democratic	  sense	  of	  justice,	  and	  Rawls’s	  description	  of	  the	  motivation	  of	  people	  in	  the	  original	  position,	  particularly,	  as	  Weale	  himself	  suggests,	  in	  Rawls’s	  early	  writings	  about	  justice	  as	  fairness	  (see,	  p.	  231	  and	  pp.	  275-­‐276,	  ft.	  14	  and	  ft.	  16).	  5	  Rawls	  discusses	  constitutional	  democracy	  in	  A	  Theory	  (1971)	  in	  the	  chapter	  on	  ‘Equal	  liberty’,	  particularly	  at	  pp.	  195-­‐201,	  and	  (in	  relation	  to	  the	  principle	  of	  ‘participation’)	  at	  pp.	  221-­‐234.	  Political	  Liberalism	  (2005)	  further	  expands	  on	  some	  these	  issues.	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  6	  Sidgwick’s	  work	  is	  explicitly	  referred	  to	  in	  both	  Weale	  (1998)	  and	  (2004),	  though	  only	  incidentally	  in	  (2013).	  Sidgwick’s	  method	  is	  also	  an	  important,	  and	  recognized,	  influence	  in	  Rawls	  (1971).	  	  7	  This	  distinction	  will	  be	  briefly	  discussed	  below,	  as	  that	  between	  ‘contractarian’	  and	  ‘contractualist’	  theories,	  respectively.	  8	  Cf.	  p.	  xxi,	  where	  Weale	  says	  that	  his	  contractarian	  turning	  point	  came	  at	  a	  conference	  in	  Toronto,	  at	  York	  University,	  on	  the	  work	  of	  David	  Gauthier.	  9	  Cf.	  Ashford	  and	  Mulgan	  (2012)	  and	  Cudd	  (2012).	  10	  Cf.	  also	  Weale,	  1998;	  Hardin,	  1998,	  pp.	  148-­‐52;	  Matravers,	  1998,	  and	  2000,	  p.	  100.	  11	  Notice,	  however,	  that	  Weale’s	  theory	  is	  still	  operating	  at	  the	  ‘ideal	  theory’	  level,	  though	  his	  empirical	  approach	  is	  more	  sensitive	  to	  reflective	  equilibrium.	  12	  Barry	  (1995,	  pp.	  35-­‐37)	  thinks	  that	  a	  system	  of	  moral	  sanctions	  based	  on	  rational	  calculation	  of	  mutual	  advantage	  is	  ‘unfeasible’	  because,	  contrary	  to	  a	  system	  of	  legal	  sanctions,	  cannot	  rely	  on	  enforcement	  mechanisms	  to	  overcome	  collective	  action	  problems;	  and	  it	  is	  intrinsically	  ‘fragile’	  because	  moral	  sanctions	  need	  an	  appropriate	  ‘internal	  response’	  to	  operate	  as	  such	  (i.e.	  they	  need	  a	  sense	  of	  morality).	  On	  a	  related	  point,	  see	  my	  conclusions.	  13	  Weale	  lists	  four	  in	  all	  (pp.	  103-­‐108).	  Two	  others	  are	  mentioned	  below,	  where	  I	  discuss	  the	  second	  aspect	  of	  deliberative	  rationality.	  	  14	  This	  is	  a	  narrower	  definition	  of	  public	  reason	  than	  Rawls’s	  or	  Habermas’s.	  
